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The conclusion which isto be drawn regarding the suggested qualification
of the liberal rule is that the writers, with the possible exception of Professor
Williston, have not recognized the distinction, that in a few limited situations
protection has been afforded to the bona fide purchaser by restricting the
admissibility of parol evidence of an individual usage, but that the decisions
do not recognize this qualification expressly. On the basis of the cases it is
believed, however, that this qualification may be made since no cases have been
found in which the liberal rule has been expressly applied in the case of a bona
fide purchaser, while the liberal view has been followed frequently in suits
between the immediate parties. It is urged further that the suggested qualifica-
tion will assume an increasing importance if the liberal rule secures a more
universal adoption.
A DEFENSE OF NON-MANAGING DIRECTORS
Outstanding among present day examples of the lag in legal rules behind
changing commercial practices is the case presented by non-managing (cor-
porate directors." The rapidity with which business practices are altered, es-
pecially the recent changes in the make-up of corporate boards, intensifies the
conflict between law and practice. Non-managing directors, a result of the
vast dimensions to which corporations have grown, have individually different
and more or less limited functions and competencies. They are usually sup-
posed to take little or no part in the general management of their corporations.
The law, however, still sees but one type of director-one entrusted with active
and constant supervision of all corporate officers and affairs, 2 and whose duty is
sanctioned by strong and absolute civil and penal liabilities.3 Courts and
authors alike have refused to recognize the existence of, or at least a justifica-
tion for, non-managing directors.4 A single standard of diligence and liability
is imposed upon all.5 Thus a non-managing director is considered not as a
I The distinction between non-managing and executive or managing directors has been
clearly defined in Samuel, Shareholders' Money, Append. I, §24(l) (I933).
2People v. Central Fish Co., 117 App. Div. 77, 79, io N.Y. Supp. 1io8, 1109 (1907);
Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 74 (i88o); Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17 Yale L.J.
33, 36 (907); Ballantine, Corporations 359 (1927); Samuel, op. cit. supra note i, at 141. See
also note 5 infra.
3 People v. Mancuso, 255 N.Y. 463, 469, 175 N.E. 177, 178 (i93i); Wormser, Directors
-Figures of Earth, i Brooklyn L. Rev. 28, 30, 35 (r932); Wormser, Frankenstein, Inc. 134
(1931). See New York Penal Law i909, §§ 667 (3)(d), 397 (for bankers specifically); Cali-
fornia Penal Code 1872, §§ 568, 572. See also note 5 infra.
4 People v. Mancuso, 255 N.Y. 463, 469; 175 N.E. 177, 178 (1931); Douglas, Directors
Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L.,Rev. 1305 (i934); Wormser, Directors-Figures of Earth,
z Brooklyn L. Rev. 28, 35 (932); Wormser, Frankenstein, Inc. 128 (931); Dwight, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 35.
s Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1820); Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504,
513 (i98); Allen v. Roydhouse, 232 Fed. 1010, 1014 (D.C. Pa. i9x6); Morawetz, Corporations
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different director, but as a bad one, forgetful of the uniform duties.6 It would
seem that the nature of his legal duties should depend upon the extent of the
function that it is intended he perform. If those duties conform closely to his
practical position, then more stringent enforcement may be expected from the
courts.7 Under the present legal setup, however, where a court feels the uni-
form legal duties too onerous for a particular non-managing director, a relaxa-
tion of the standards to accomplish justice in his case will, as a result of a failure
to draw the proper distinction, create precedent for a similar relaxation for all
directors. This development may explain the surprising leniency with which
courts often treat managing directors. There can be a sensible harmony be-
tween law and practice only when it is recognized that non-managing directors
have special functions, and that their failure to participate in tasks not spe-
cially assigned to them is not neglect of duty but precisely what is expected of
them.
Authors usually enumerate three types of non-managing directors: the ad-
viser, the business-connection, and the so-called "shirt-front director."' Only
the first two can be justified as truly beneficial to a corporation; the latter has
no real function. Directors of the adviser type are persons of particular per-
sonal ability, such as engineers, economists, and attorneys.9 Business-connec-
tion directors are representatives of a corporation's carrier, its banker, its cus-
tomers, and the like. A large modem corporation can hardly be without the
constant active collaboration of a staff of highly qualified advisers and of
§ 552 (2d ed. i886); Cook, Corporations § 703 (4th ed. i898); Thompson, Corporations § 1378
(1895).
This attitude is especially dear, when the standard of care required is defined as that which
the directors use in their own affairs. See People v. Mancuso, 255 N.Y. 463, 469, 175 N.E.
177, 178 (i93i); In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates, Ltd., [19xi] Ch. D. 425;
Wormser, Directors-Figures of Earth, i Brooklyn L. Rev. 28,31 (1932); Wormser, Franken-
stein, Inc. 125, 134 (1931).
6Whitfield v. Kern, 12o N.J. Eq. 115, 125, 184 At. 333, 339 (i936); Dwight, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 33; Wormser, Directors-Figures of Earth, i Brooklyn L. Rev., 28, 35
('932).
Exemplary of this attitude is the identification of non-managing directors with "financial
gigolos" and non-active directors. See Samuel, op. cit. supra note i, at I12, xI8, 140.
7Wieland, Zu dem Gesetzentwurf zur Revision des Schweizerischen Aktienrechts, in
Zeitschrift ftir Auslindisches und Internationales Privatrecht (1929) pp. 82, 85.
This might be achieved by a shift in the burden of proof to directors, requiring each to show
that he did not neglect his duties. See Douglas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1327; Dwight, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 40; Bericht des Vorsitzenden des Ausschusses ftir Aktienrecht der Akademie
fir Deutsches Recht, in Zeitschrift der Akademie fUr Deutsches Recht (1934) 33, (1935)
254. This is the German law. German Corporation Act of Feb. 4, 1937 §§ 84(2), 99.
8 Samuel, op. cit. supra note i, at 118, 120.
9 The very special problem of the investment banker is not herein discussed. See Brandeis,
Other Peoples' Money (1933).
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representatives of its business associates."' The good will created by these con-
nections cannot be ignored. These directors keep before the eyes of the man-
agers a miniature picture of the economic world in which the corporation lives;
the conference room of the board restores to the managing directors that per-
spective which is so easily obstructed by the narrow walls of the plant's office.-
The legal reaction toward the presence of these men, however, is almost
unanimously unfavorable in this country. 2 Those who stand up vigorously
against it seem to be motivated mainly by the narrow conception of directors
as general managers; thus non-managing directors are excluded a priori. But
even those who accept the value of their collaboration adhere to the traditional
definition,13 and ask that all non-managers be either deprived of their votes or
relegated to a sort of advisory board with no power whatsoever.'4 The reason
for such a desire is more than the mechanical proposition that "the duty of a
director is to direct."'5 It is the fear that these men have not the same interests
as the managing directors, but will prefer the interests of themselves or of some
other corporation which they may represent.x6 The proposals urged by such
directors, however, may actually be advantageous to the corporation, and the
variety of interest among the non-managing directors may serve as a real
counterbalance for a domineering management.
It seems advisable, too, that the non-managers be voting members of the
board. It must be feared that the traditional "goldpiece" would not be suffi-
cient to induce advisers and business-connections to enter a corporation only
to be relegated to a position of impotence. More important, the non-managing
directors are a power with which to be reckoned, if they have votes.' 7 Their
real supervision, or its potentiality, over the managing directors would pre-
vent the managers from becoming too independent and careless in their poli-
cies. The main benefit of advisers, as compared with technical employees, lies
xo "One of the best assets of a corporation is the advice and assistance of men of business
experience and large business connections upon its board." Kavanaugh v. Gould, 147 App.
Div. 281, 289, 131 N.Y. Supp. 1059, io65 (19xi). See also Berle and Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property 231, note i (1934); Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen 16, 17
(21st ed. 1922). See also Report of the English Company Law Amendment (Wilfred Greene)
Committee (1926) No. 46.
"See Douglas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1313-14.
12 A more favorable view is attempted in Stevens, Corporations 59o-91 (1936), and on a
very special basis in Douglas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1312-14.
'1 Wormser, Frankenstein, Inc. 136 (193).
'4 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 4, at x305; Wormser, op. cit. supra note i3; Samuel, op.
cit. supra note i, at 124.
"See People v. Central Fish Co., 117 App. Div. 77, 79, ioi N.Y. Supp. iio8, 9 (19o7).
,6 See Samuel, op. cit. supra note i, at 171.
17 Rathenau, op. cit. supra note io, at 15; Douglas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1307, 1312-
1314. Zeitschrift der Akademie fur deutsches Recht (1934), op. cit. supra note 7, at 30.
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in their independence of the management.,' This independence would dis-
appear, even if sufficiently high salaries were paid, for it must be feared that
the managing directors would ignore the very existence of those who had no
power to make themselves heard. One might still suggest that non-managing
directors, even without votes, may exert influence if they have strong enough
personalities. That, however, would create power without responsibility. If, to
remedy this, it is suggested to impose responsibility proportionate to the in-
fluence exerted,'9 the suggestion comes back to the original proposal of a parti-
tion of the board, into managing and non-managing directors.20
The main consequence of a recognition of the distinction that exists would
be a complete reorientation of directors' duties and liabilities. The changes, of
course, should concern only the care and diligence required of them. Fiduciary
disqualifications and liability for intentional acts must remain unchanged, the
same for all directors. But for directors whose duties are individually different,
and relating to certain specified corporate activites only, there would be no
general duty to collaborate on all matters. Each non-managing director would
be held only for neglect of that for which he was appointed and for active inter-
vention in acts which are outside his competence.2 ' The legal position of non-
managing directors would then correspond to their position in fact.2
Precedent in America, drawing any distinction between managing and non-
managing directors is, however, singularly lacking. In one Rhode Island case,2 3
a new trial was granted after a directed verdict against a director who was also
treasurer, upon a showing that it was well-known that his function was wholly
18 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1314; Zeitschrift der Akademie far Deutsches Recht
(1934), op. cit. supra note 7, at 3o .
19 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1313.
"0 The German law goes still further and provides for two wholly separate boards. German
Corp. Act of Feb. 4, 1937. The non-managing directors, elected by the shareholders (§ 87),
form a board of supervision and elect from outside their membership the board of manage-
ment which remains responsible toward them (§ 75). Thus they have even more than equality
of power.
21 But he should not be allowed to restrict his activity to mere attendance at board meetings
involving his particular field, as has been suggested in Dovey v. Cary, [igoi] A.C. 477, 492;
In re City Equltable Fire Ins. Co., [1925] Ch. 407, 429. See Samuel, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 129; Zeitschrift der Akademie fur Deutsches Recht (1934) op. cit. supra note 7, at 254;
Evidence given before the English Company Law Amendment Committee (Wilfred Greene)
(1926), Question no. 1239.
- See Zeitschrift der Akademie fiir Deutsches Recht (1934), op. cit. suplra note 7, at 29.
23 Conaty v. Torghen, 46 R. I. 447,453, i28 Atl. 338, 34I (I925). See Kavanaugh v. Gould,
147 App. Div; ,i2 , 291, 31 N.Y. Supp. io5g, io66 (I911), where this distinction as to "both
*.. duty and liability" was based on an express provision in the by-laws that an executive
committee be nominated by the board of directors. This provision was authorized by § 42
of the Banking Laws, Cons. Laws N.Y. 19o9, c. 2. See also Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan
& Savings Bank, 75 Fed. 781, 787 (C.C.S.C. 1896); note 12 supra.
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ministerial. The court said that an officer or director "is liable for want of
reasonable care giving due consideration to the nature of the corporate busi-
ness, his own particular duties and the time, place, and circumstances in which he is
expected to perform them."24 Another distinction, admitted by a few courts, is
founded upon the remuneration received by the different directors.25 Although
this may help to distinguish managing from non-managing directors, it is of
little aid in differentiating among the non-managing directors themselves.
Some courts beg the question by saying that directors undertake to have "full
competence." 26 Other courts hold directors liable only for so much skill as
they declared to possess,2 7 thus accepting as a sufficient excuse the fact that
the shareholders knew he was not fully competent when appointed. The de-
cisive factor, however, should not be the degree of competency, but rather the
fields in which it is necessary that he be competent. If it is assumed that the
situation is one in which he was intended to act, a knowledge on the part of
shareholders that he was incompetent should not excuse him.21 One line of
cases refused to hold liable non-resident directors for failure to attend meet-
ings,29 but today the non-residence is generally viewed as rather clear evidence
of negligence.3O The latter view is in full accord with the current failure to draw
any distinctions among directors. The former may well have been based on
the idea that the director should not be held liable for a failure to do that
which no one intended that he should. In any event, these attempts by a few
courts toward differentiating among directors fall short of establishing a genu-
inely flexible standard.
It is not a change in the degree of care required that is needed, but rather
a correlation of the activities to which the present standards 3z of care should
be applied with the expectation of the persons involved. Any change from the
fixed law3 2 on that point could best be made by statute. The English Coin-
2' Conaty v. Torghen, 46 R.I. 447, 453, 228 At. 338, 341 (1925) (italics added).
2S Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530, 543, 6 S.W. 582, 585 (1888); First State Bank of Norton-
ville v. Morton, 146 Ky. 287, 294, 142 S.W. 694, 697 (2912); Dunn v. Kyle, 77 Ky. 134, 142
(1878); Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 283 Mo. 237, 250, 223 S.W. 423, 426 (1920); Spellman,
Corporate Directors 536 (1931). Contra: Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 405 (1742).
6 Warren v. Robison, ig Utah 289, 300, 57 Pac. 287, 290 (i899); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y.
65, 74 (188o).
27 Dunn v. Kyle, 77 Ky. 134, 138 (1879); Story, Bailments § 2820 (8th ed. 1870).
28 Dwight, op. cit. supra note 2, at 33. Wormser, op. ci. supra note 13, at 228.
29 Wallach v. Billings, 277 I1. 218, 234, 1I5 N.E. 382, 388 (I9,7); noted in 12 I . L. Rev.
256 (1917).
30 Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 524 (2929); Dwight, op. cit. supra note 2, at 39.
32 See Allen v. Roydhouse, 232 Fed. loO, 1014 (D.C. Pa. 1916).
" Leterman v. Pink, 294 App. Div. 64, 269, 291 N.Y. Supp. 249, 254 (936); People v.
Central Fish Co., 217 App. Div. 77, 79, 2o N.Y. Supp. iO8, 1109 (1907); Ballantine, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 359.
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panies Act of 192933 seems to be an excellent example. No differentiations in
the English board have been spelled out,34 but the courts have power to exempt
from liability any director who can show "that he has acted honestly and
reasonably and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, in-
cluding those connected with his appointment, he ought to be fairly excused from
the negligence."35 This solution, it was explained, is required to "meet the
case of a director who has been appointed because of his special knowledge
for a special purpose and not to direct the business of the Company generally." 36
Similar notions have been employed in so many other countries that the dis-
tinction between managing and non-managing directors as here described, with
its consequences on their different duties and liabilities, may be considered as
being, under one form or another, the general rule of European legal system.37
Following in particular the English statute, it would seem best that the
law merely formulate the principle, and leave its application in the individual
case to the courts, for detailed legislative rules fixing the liability of each pos-
sible type of non-managing director would be extremely difficult to establish
and even more delicate to apply. Courts have always made this type of in-
quiry, for they have taken into account in each case the nature of the corpora-
tion, its business, the act complained of, and the like.38 It should not, there-
fore, be too difficult for the inquiry to be extended to the individual position
of the accused director himself. Here, of course, lie the main practical difficul-
ties of the proposed system; it will not always be simple to ascertain the func-
tions of a director and to determine whether the act was a part of them. But
it is not believed that these difficulties are too great. The main factor of de-
termination must be the conditions attendant upon the appointment of the
director. In fact practically every non-managing director enters his office on
definite understandings concerning his fitness and his functions39 These under-
standings can be shown by various factors: his background, his qualifications,
his function in other enterprises, actual work done by him previously in the
corporation in question, and the function of the director who preceded him.
33 1g and 2o Geo. V, c.23.
34 Id. §§ 139 et seq.
35 Id. § 372(I) (italics added).
36 Report of the English Company Law Amendment (Wilfred Greene) Committee (1926),
No. 47.
37 Although the accomplishment of the distinction is universal, the methods used are not
uniform, but vary from the rigid German division at one extreme (note 21-23 supra) to the
highly flexible English system at the other (notes 34-37 supra). For a detailed comparative
analysis of the foreign methods, see HaUstein, Die Aktienrechte der Gegenwart (1931).
38 See Briggs v. Spaulding, 41 U.S. 132, 147 (i8go); Conaty v. Torghen, 46 R.I. 447,
453, 128 Atl. 338, 341 (1925); Morawetz, op. cit. supra note 5, § 552.
39 See: Report of the English Company Law Amendment (Wilfred Greene) Committee
(1926), No. 47; Rathenau, op. cit. supra note io, at 17.
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It is conceivable that as to each non-managing director a statement should
be published upon his appointment and included in all prospectuses and reports
setting forth the function which he is to serve.40 This statement would prove
useful to the courts and would operate as notice to the public which might
otherwise suppose that the director was intended to direct, supervise, and
control in general.4'
With the English Act as an example and its successful operation42 for en-
couragement, it would seem that a similar change in this country to achieve
consistency between law and practice merits serious consideration.
40 A similar notion has been suggested. Samuel, op. cit. supra note i, at 140-41.
41 This danger of misplaced reliance has been one of the main arguments of the opponents
of the differentiation. See Samuel, op. cit. supra note i, at 124.
42 Professor Douglas calls this system "extremely useful in many connections." Douglas,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 1328, note 63.
